

## ROUTING

| TO:                                | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE           | INITIALS |
|------------------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------|
|                                    |                  |                |          |
| 2                                  |                  |                |          |
| 3                                  |                  |                |          |
| 4                                  |                  |                |          |
| ACTION                             | DIRECT REPLY     | PREPARE REPLY  |          |
| APPROVAL                           | DISPATCH         | RECOMMENDATION |          |
| COMMENT                            | FILE             | RETURN         |          |
| CONCURRENCE                        | INFORMATION      | SIGNATURE      |          |
| REMARKS:                           |                  |                |          |
|                                    |                  |                |          |
| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. |                  |                | DATE     |
|                                    |                  |                |          |
|                                    |                  |                |          |

~~TOP SECRET~~  
(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Access to this document will be restricted to  
those approved for the following specific activities:

|  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |



Warning Notice  
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved  
**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions



~~TOP SECRET~~  
(Security Classification)

**DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS**

|             |                                                                         |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| NOFORN-     | Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals                                     |
| NOCONTRACT- | Not Releasable to Contractors or<br>Contractor/Consultants              |
| PROPIN-     | Caution-Proprietary Information Involved                                |
| USIBONLY-   | USIB Departments Only                                                   |
| ORCON-      | Dissemination and Extraction of Information<br>Controlled by Originator |
| REL . . . - | This Information has been Authorized for<br>Release to . . .            |

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

6 October 1980

MEMORANDUM

NARCOTICS SUPPRESSION IN EASTERN TURKEY:  
PROSPECTS

Summary and Key Judgments

Turkey presents a complex narcotics control problem. First, as the traditional land bridge between Europe and the Near East, Turkey is a major transit point for opiates originating in Southwest Asia. Second, Turkey is a principal Southwest Asian center for narcotics refining and processing, supplying heroin to the West European drug market. Until at least last year, morphine base processed in Turkey supplied illicit Italian laboratories producing heroin for the US market.

nevertheless, we believe that Turkey is central to the transit of raw opium and morphine base to the Levant.

Most illicit narcotics activity in Turkey occurs in the Kurdish-dominated eastern provinces, an area the Turkish Government considers politically explosive. Prior to the coup, elements of the military proposed harsh measures against the Kurdish separatists.

*This memorandum was prepared by the National Foreign Assessment Center of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was reviewed by representatives of the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration who are in general agreement with its conclusions.*

Copy No. 9 of 25

PA M 80-10442C

DERIVATIVE CL BY  
☐ DECL ☐ REVW ON 6 Oct 2000  
DERIVED FROM Multiple

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

A US effort to enlist the participation of the Turkish Government in an aggressive narcotics control program has potentially serious drawbacks if pursued at the present time. Pressure on the new government could antagonize the military regime. Even if it acceded to a US demarche, intensive government operations against the Kurds could precipitate political unrest in the eastern provinces. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Should this happen, human rights issues could seriously complicate existing US narcotics control programs in Turkey. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

A number of other considerations also work against the effective implementation of a major new narcotics control initiative in Turkey:

--During this period of heightened tension to the south and east, the Turkish military is preoccupied with external threats and may be disinclined to focus on narcotics suppression.

--Turkey's borders are highly porous and difficult to patrol.

--Processing labs are located in remote areas, are of a temporary nature, and thus are difficult to detect.

--Turkish police forces (the National Police and the Jandarma) are presently targeted against internal terrorist activity and probably reluctant to be burdened with drug control.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

On the other hand, the Turkish Government has strong reasons of its own to attempt to suppress narcotics trafficking and production and probably would be responsive to quiet US encouragement of its anti-narcotics efforts and to continuing

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

US bilateral aid directed at upgrading its police and customs capabilities. The Turkish Government perceives a functional linkage between narcotics activities, arms smuggling, and political violence: its belief is that without the profits from narcotics production and trafficking, terrorists and other political extremists could not afford weapons. If the military and police are to take more vigorous action, the current state of nationwide martial law affords an ideal opportunity for employing their resources to the fullest. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Turkey relies heavily on the US pharmaceutical industry as a market for its licit opiate production, which without adequate markets could be diverted to the illicit traffic. Turkey has been insistent that US policy, presently under review by the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), exclude new suppliers (such as Australia and France). United Nations resolutions, cosponsored by the US, support the Turkish position. Preferential access to the US market might strengthen Turkey's efforts to control narcotics production in general and provide a positive incentive for increased cooperation on other narcotics control issues. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

#### The Narcotics Situation in Eastern Turkey

Eastern Turkey is the major transshipment/staging area and a heroin refining area for opiates from the Golden Crescent (Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) bound for the European market. The area probably still refines and/or transships some morphine base to heroin processing labs in Italy that supply the US market. Despite Turkish efforts to halt the smuggling of narcotics through their country, the flow appears to be increasing. It is uncertain whether refining activity is also increasing. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

#### Cultivation

Prior to the ban on opium cultivation in 1972, Turkey was the major source of raw material for the French labs processing heroin for the European and US markets. Licit opium production in Turkey was instituted in 1975 under strict government control; little, if any, of this opium makes its way to the illicit market. Some illicit cultivation of poppies does occur in the eastern provinces, but the Turkish Government is able to detect and destroy most of this production [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] While some cultivation undoubtedly escapes [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

# Southwest Asian Opium Traffic



628207 10-80 CIA

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

detection, it is probably negligible compared to the large amounts coming into Turkey from the countries to the east.

(b)(3)

### Trafficking

Turkey is the land bridge between the producing countries of the Golden Crescent and the consumer countries in the West, and traffickers on both sides of the border have profited from this situation. The raw material--opium and morphine base--supplying the labs in eastern Turkey originates in the Kurdish and Azari areas of western Iran and perhaps in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This material enters eastern Turkey by animal carrier through the mountains or concealed in vehicles through the border checkpoint at Bazargan.

(b)(3)

The mountainous, sparsely populated border between the two countries is an extremely difficult area to patrol and control adequately, and neither the Turkish nor the Iranian Government has ever had much success halting cross-border smuggling. Movement through the narrow valleys and passes crossing the border is limited generally to animal carrier. During the winter months movement is virtually impossible because of heavy snows.

(b)(3)

A variety of methods and modes of transport are employed to move opiates through and out of Turkey. After processing, heroin and morphine base are moved to various cities in south-eastern Turkey for distribution to Europe. Narcotics traffickers in these cities sell to other traffickers in Istanbul or export the narcotics directly to Europe. Some unprocessed opium is also shipped by sea and overland--via Syria and other Arab countries--to Egypt

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

### Refining in Turkey

Most of the opium and morphine base that enters Turkey is probably refined in temporary labs scattered throughout the Kurdish areas of eastern Turkey. This region, with its rugged terrain, offers innumerable safehavens for the simply equipped but high-quality labs that are a trademark of Turkish chemists. The labs are put into operation, usually in a remote village, only when a chemist has been contracted for and the chemicals

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

and hardware procured. The preponderance of heroin reaching Europe appears to be manufactured in these labs. However the source of supply for morphine base destined for the Italian heroin laboratories appears to be increasingly diversified, coming not only through Turkey, but also through Lebanon and Syria. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

### Political Considerations

Turkey's top military leaders took over the government on 12 September to stem what they saw as a slide toward anarchy and civil war. The politicians were perceived as unable to push aside their ideological and personal differences and work together for the good of the country, despite repeated warnings from the military to do so. Both Justice Party leader Demirel and Republican People's Party chief Ecevit headed weak and factional coalition governments over the last decade that were unable to deal with the social and economic inequities, primarily due to rapid modernization and urbanization, that fueled domestic strife. Increasing extremist violence was fueled by sectarian and ethnic divisions that polarized society. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

The first priority of the military leaders is to restore public order and stability. They have imposed martial law over the entire nation and are now intent on cracking down on extremists. The civilian interim government that was installed by Chief of Staff Evren and the five-man National Security Council is tasked with running the country and promulgating laws that would speed the return to order and restore democratic rule. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

### Eastern Turkey and the Kurds

It will be particularly difficult to restore order in eastern Turkey. Ankara's authority has traditionally been weaker there than elsewhere in Turkey. The region is inhabited by about 12 million Kurds--one quarter of the population--who dwell in a rugged, mountainous area that comprises one-third of the national territory. The Kurds are considered "mountain Turks," set apart from the rest of the population both geographically and psychologically. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Kurdish traditions--culture,


(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(3)



# Kurdish Areas and Probable Major Opiate Refining Areas



**Secret**

628206 10-80 CIA

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

language, social mores--and political rights are generally restricted or proscribed. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

Moreover, Kurdish allegiances follow tribal or family lines, compounding the control problems faced by any central government in the region. Because tribes are spread across borders into Iran and Iraq, there has also been an historic movement of people across national boundaries. The Kurds disdain central governments, and over the decades, the Kurdish aspiration for at least cultural autonomy has fostered a separatist movement. Historically, the Kurds have fought one another as fiercely as they have the central governments.

(b)(3)

Practically all Kurds in Turkey view the large military presence in eastern Turkey--the only real element of central government authority--as an occupation army. Conversely, elements of the military view Kurdish separatists as political extremists. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] the military is preoccupied with governing the country and watching the Iran-Iraq conflict. Nonetheless, the military may have begun arresting troublesome Kurdish tribal leaders, an action that could precipitate the very goal it seeks to avoid: political unrest in eastern Turkey. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

### Constraints

A US initiative so soon after the military takeover could embarrass the government and, if public, cause popular indignation among the Turks. Pressing the Turkish Government to cooperate on narcotics could risk undermining the pro-Western military regime by fueling nationalist and leftist allegations that the US was responsible for the September military intervention. Indeed, US encouragement of Turkish military governments in the early 1970s to eliminate poppy cultivation created anti-US feelings that contributed to a rescinding of the cultivation ban in 1974. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

The military commanders are also likely to resent any US approach focusing solely on the processing of narcotics. Although Turkish officials recognize that they have a problem with narcotics transiting their country, they are only slowly coming to admit the existence of processing and refining activity that takes place inside Turkey. Indeed, Ankara views the entire issue of narcotics as part of a broader, more serious smuggling problem. The military leaders are convinced that weapons purchased with funds acquired from narcotics production and trafficking have contributed to the political violence that has plagued the country for the last five years.

(b)(3)

Turkish-US narcotics relations have not been harmonious in recent years. Indeed, the first US-Turkish bilateral narcotics agreement, providing \$500,000 in assistance to the Turkish National Police (TNP), was concluded in 1980; this agreement provides foreign exchange funds for equipment, training, and fuel to the TNP. While the Turkish Government would probably be receptive to US offers of additional support to enhance their narcotics enforcement capabilities, a specific US request to launch a campaign to eliminate narcotics processing and trafficking in eastern Turkey would probably receive a cool reception, particularly given the political situation in eastern Turkey.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Moreover, Ankara is dissatisfied with the US position on other issues in US-Turkish narcotics relations. The Bolvadin poppy-straw processing plant, built

(b)(1)

to halt illicit opium production, is designed to process Turkey's licit production into concentrate for sale on the international market. Although scheduled to go into production in 1981, the factory lacks the necessary capital and equipment to begin operation. The Turks may ask for further assistance or threaten to return to the incision method of harvest which is difficult to control and could open up licit production to large-scale diversion into the illicit market. Indeed, the Turkish Government has insisted that the US give preferential market access to Turkish opiate exports to the exclusion of newer supply countries such as Australia and France.

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

On the broader level, Turkey might press for greater economic and military aid from both the US and OECD countries and might use the occasion of a US initiative on narcotics to bolster its arguments. At a time when Turkey has become increasingly frustrated in its attempts to secure from the US the type and level of military assistance it believes is its due as a faithful NATO ally, the Turkish General Staff is almost certain to view pressure from Washington to undertake narcotics suppression duties with a jaundiced eye. If the generals were willing to cooperate at all, they would demand a substantial increase in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits and reinstitution of grant aid as a quid pro quo for their cooperation. The Turks might also expect the US to finance the entire program. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

#### Economic Considerations

The government's economic stabilization program has brought some improvement to Turkey's precarious financial situation. The inflation rate has been cut in half and shortages have been largely eliminated, contributing to the decline of the once-flourishing black market. The foreign trade deficit has improved somewhat, and workers' remittances are up. Unemployment, however, remains high, industrial production is down, and public finances are severely strained. Thus, Ankara probably cannot afford large expenditures for narcotics-related equipment, training, maintenance, and operations. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

The eastern section is by far the poorest region in Turkey, and economic development in the region has not kept pace with the rest of the country. Though eastern Turkey has almost 15 percent of the population, it receives less than 10 percent of national income. A cross-border trade in cattle, arms, narcotics, and other contraband has long afforded some Kurds a source of livelihood. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

#### Military and Police Capabilities

Any move by the Turkish Government to seize processing laboratories and interdict the flow of narcotics into the eastern provinces could involve as many as four organizations: the Turkish National Police (TNP), the Jandarma, Customs, and the Army. A preoccupation with internal security matters,

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(1)  
[redacted] and severely limited capabilities all work against any of these organizations assuming a new or expanded narcotics suppression role. Furthermore, as the military government purges the civil service of extremist sympathizers, existing capabilities may decline somewhat for a period of time. [redacted] (b)(3)  
(b)(1)

The TNP [redacted] is the principal narcotics enforcement agency. [redacted]

The high incidence of terrorist activity has also reduced the numbers of officers assigned to narcotics duties. [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(1)  
[redacted] The Jandarma is a paramilitary force responsible for law enforcement in rural areas, border patrol, and smuggling control. Already overburdened with the extensive internal security duties involved in enforcing martial law, it would probably have problems in expanding its relatively narrow narcotics role. Limited police training and equipment shortages are also problems. The Turkish Customs has no authority to conduct narcotics investigations; it only interdicts. [redacted] (b)(1)  
[redacted] (b)(3)

The Turkish Army is organized, equipped, and trained primarily to defend the country against a Warsaw Pact attack. At present, the military is also preoccupied with governing the country and monitoring the Iran-Iraq conflict for any spillover into eastern and southeastern Turkey. It is not designed, equipped, or trained for narcotics suppression. In addition, the Army, like the Jandarma, has been drawn increasingly into martial law enforcement duties, and Army commanders would probably be unenthusiastic about the addition of narcotics suppression to a list of ancillary responsibilities that they see as keeping them from their primary mission: defending the country against external military threats.

[redacted] (b)(3)

In sum, these four organizations probably cannot now take on a more active narcotics suppression role. They are ill-suited for criminal investigations and intelligence-gathering, particularly against targets hostile toward the central

(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] (b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

government. Finally, the rugged terrain and poor road system of eastern Turkey would require the Turkish Government to substantially upgrade their equipment, such as helicopters and heavy vehicles. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

-10-

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(3)

(b)(3)